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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court has jurisdiction of this federally-certified 
question pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
As stated in the November 6, 1991 Order of 
Certification (R. Vol. Ill, Docket #124) of Judge J. Thomas 
Greene of the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, the issues of law certified for determination by this 
Court are: 
1. Should the Liability Reform Act of 1986, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37, et seq. (1987), be interpreted to permit 
the decedent's employer to be named upon a special verdict form 
for the purpose of permitting the jury to allocate to it a 
portion of the fault which caused or contributed to the death, 
notwithstanding that the employer is immune from suit pursuant 
to the Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 
(1988)? 
2. Would interpretation of the Liability Reform Act 
of 1986, Utah Code Ann. § § 78-27-37, et seq., to permit the 
naming of a decedent's employer upon a special verdict form for 
the purpose of permitting the jury to allocate to it a portion 
of the fault which caused or contributed to the death 
contravene Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5? 
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Standard of Review: The above issues are issues of 
law, which are reviewed by the Court for correctness. Bonham 
v. Morgan 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). While Judge Greene 
certified these questions, he did not decide them. However, 
United States Magistrate Calvin Gould issued an Order (R. Vol. 
II, Docket #99) deciding the first question in appellee's 
favor. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
- Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-27-37 et seq. 
- The "exclusive remedy" statute of the Workers' 
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60. 
- Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5 
As provided in Rule 24(a)(6), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, these statutes are set forth in an addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of The Case and Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff Cynthia Gines, on her own behalf and as 
guardian ad litem of her minor children, filed this wrongful 
death action for damages stemming from the death of her husband 
and the children's father, Randy Gines. Mr. Gines was killed 
in an underground coal mine accident on August 9, 1988. 
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Mr, Gines was employed by U.S. Fuel Co., the 
owner/operator of the underground coal mine at which the death 
occurred. Defendants contend that the employer's conduct 
played a role in the death. While Defendants concede they 
cannot join the employer as a party, they desire to have the 
jury consider the employer's conduct and allocate to it a 
portion of the fault contributing to Mr. Gines' death. 
Defendants filed a "Motion In Limine Re: Inclusion of 
Employer on Special Verdict" (R. Vol. I Docket #70) to name the 
employer on the special verdict form, and to have the jury 
apportion its fault along with that of Defendants and 
Plaintiffs' decedent, if any. 
Defendants' Motion was referred to United States 
Magistrate Calvin Gould for decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636. The Magistrate issued his Order denying Defendants' 
Motion In Limine (R. Vol. II, Docket #99) on June 25, 1991. 
Defendants filed an Objection to the Magistrate's Order (R. 
Vol. II, Docket #103) which was heard before Judge Greene on 
October 17, 1991. Judge Greene deferred ruling on Defendants' 
objection pending resolution of these issues by the Utah State 
Supreme Court. An Order of Certification issued on November 6, 
1991 (R. Vol. Ill, Docket #124). 
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Statement of Facts 
For purposes of the Motion in Limine below, the 
parties agreed to the following statement of facts (R. Vol. II, 
Docket #84, p.3) : 
1. Plaintiffs' decedent, an employee of U. S. Fuel, 
was killed in a mining accident on August 9, 1988. 
2. The fatal accident involved a roof-bolting 
machine manufactured by defendants. 
3. Plaintiffs brought this wrongful death action 
against defendants, alleging products liability and negligence. 
4. The employer of plaintiffs1 decedent, U. S. Fuel, 
is not a party to this action due to the statutory immunity 
conferred on employers by Utah's workers' compensation statutes. 
5. Evidence has been adduced that U. S. Fuel may 
share some fault or negligence in this fatal accident. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT 
The fundamental purpose of the Liability Reform Act 
would be defeated by the result urged by plaintiff. Parties 
would be saddled with the fault of non-parties. This Court 
should rule, as have other jurisdictions with similar 
comparative negligence statutes, that the jury can allocate 
fault to an employer under the Liability Reform Act. 
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Such a ruling would not contravene Utah's Workers' 
Compensation Act or Art. XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitutution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WEIGH THE FAULT OF 
THE EMPLOYER IN A TORT ACTION. 
This wrongful death action is governed by Utah's 
Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 through 43. 
This legislation, enacted in 1986, abolished joint and several 
liability in favor of "pure" comparative negligence, wherein a 
defendant's liability is limited to his percentage of fault. 
The issue herein is whether, under the Liability 
Reform Act, the jury may allocate fault only to named parties, 
or whether non-party employers may be allocated fault as well. 
All references are to Utah Code Annotated, unless 
otherwise noted. 
A. Excluding the Employer from the Special Verdict 
Defeats the Purpose of the Liability Reform Act. 
The intent of Utah's Liability Reform Act is readily 
evinced from its language: 
[N]o defendant is liable to any person 
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of 
the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant. 
§ 78-27-38. 
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Similarly, § 78-27-40 provides that: 
. . . the maximum amount for which a 
defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage or 
proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. 
Plainly, the legislature's purpose in enacting the 
Liability Reform Act was to correct the perceived inequity of 
the doctrine of joint and several liability under the 
Comparative Negligence Act. That statutory framework was 
replaced by one in which each defendant answered for his own 
fault, and not that of others. 
To accomplish its stated purpose of apportioning 
liability upon fault, the Liability Reform Act provides for 
joinder of parties who "may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage." § 78-27-41. In this manner, all those who 
contributed to the injury will be joined for a "global" 
allocation of fault. However, a problem arises when a person 
at fault is immune. The Act defines "defendant" as "any person 
not immune from suit . . . ." § 78-27-37(1). Under this 
definition, an employer whose negligence contributed to the 
employee's accident may not be joined as a defendant. 
Plaintiff will undoubtedly argue that this language precludes 
the jury's determination of an employer's fault. However, that 
result does not follow from the language cited. Moreover, such 
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a result would contravene the fundamental purpose of the 
Liability Reform Act. 
The restriction on joinder of immune persons does not 
preclude a jury's weighing of the fault of such persons. The 
jury considers those persons to allocate their fault, not to 
impose liability. Immunity would be preserved, as would the 
Act *s purpose of limiting a defendant's liability to his own 
fault. By contrast, if a jury were prevented from allocating 
the fault of a negligent but immune actor, the intent of the 
Act would be defeated. The fault of the immune actor would be 
"spread" among the named parties. The jury would have no 
choice but to distribute between parties the fault of 
non-parties. A party would be liable for the fault of others, 
a result flatly contrary to the Act's purpose and language. 
Plaintiff argues that apportionment to an immune 
non-party violates the language of § 78-27-39, which provides 
for a special verdict determining the percentage of fault 
attributable "to each person seeking recovery and to each 
defendant." Plaintiff's argument is that this language 
"implies" the negative, i.e., that an allocation to a non-party 
is prohibited by the statutory language. An identical argument 
was rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Pocatello Ind. Park 
Co. v. Steel West, Ind. 621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980). The 
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plaintiff therein argued that negligence could not be allocated 
to non-parties because Idaho's comparative negligence statute, 
§ 6-802 I.e., authorized the jury to allocate negligence "to 
each party." The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that argument: 
While the statute requires that parties be 
included in this special verdict, it does 
not state that only parties shall be 
included. Minnesota's comparative 
negligence statute, Minn. Stat. § 604.01, is 
identical to ours and the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has also concluded that non-parties 
may be included in the special verdict. 
Lines v. Ryan 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978). 
Id. at 403 n.4. (Court's emphasis) 
Plaintiff's focus on isolated language in the 
Liability Reform Act is inconsistent with rules of statutory 
construction. A statute should be interpreted to effectuate 
its purpose, even if that application doesn't comport with its 
literal language: 
"[0]ne of the fundamental rules of statutory 
construction is that the statute should be looked 
at as a whole and in light of the general purpose 
it was intended to serve; and should be so 
interpreted and applied so as to accomplish that 
objective. In order to give the statute the full 
implementation which will fulfill its purpose, 
reason and intention sometimes prevail over 
technically applied literalness". 
Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah, 1965) (citations 
omitted). 
This Court should rule that a jury may weigh the fault 
of an immune employer, though not a party. This result does 
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not contravene the language of the Act, and preserves its 
purpose. As argued below, other jurisdictions have reached 
such a result. 
B. The Utah Workers' Compensation Act Does not 
Prohibit the Jury From Weighing the Fault of the 
Employer. 
Plaintiff argued in United States District Court that 
allocation to an employer is impossible because "the employer 
can have no 'fault1" (R. Vol. II, Docket #84, p. 4). This is 
true in the context of workers' compensation, a no-fault system 
in which an injured employee is entitled to benefits 
independent of fault. However, that analysis does not apply to 
a tort action, the purpose of which is to allocate fault. 
The jury's apportionment of an employer's fault does 
not contravene the language of the "exclusive remedy" statute 
of the Workers' Compensation Act. § 35-1-60 provides in part 
that: 
the liabilities of the employer imposed by this 
act shall be in place of any and all other 
civil liability whatsoever, at common law, or 
otherwise . . . and no action at law may be 
maintained against an employer . . . based on 
any accident, injury or death of an employee, 
(emphasis added) 
The result urged by defendants would not violate any provision 
of this "exclusive remedy" statute. No civil liability would 
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be assessed against the employer, and the employer would not be 
joined in any action. 
To support her argument that an employer can have no 
"fault" under the Workers' Compensation Act, plaintiff relies 
on Curtis v. Harmon Electronic, Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976) 
and Phillips v. Union Pacific R.R.Co. 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980) 
(R. Vol. II, Docket #84, p. 6 et seq.). These Utah authorities 
are inapposite, cases in which defendant sought to join 
plaintiff's employer for contribution purposes. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected such claims because an employer's only 
liability is for worker's compensation. This distinction is 
missed by plaintiff: unlike the defendants in Curtis and 
Phillips, defendants herein do not seek to join the employer or 
impose liability upon the employer. Defendant seeks only to 
have the employer's fault allocated. 
Plaintiff blurs the concepts of fault and liability, 
ignoring the bright line between the two: fault can be 
allocated without imposing liability. This preserves the 
employer's immunity and preserves the purpose of the Liability 
Reform Act. Kansas and Idaho have achieved both goals, as 
argued below. 
Plaintiff also relies on Professor Larsen's treatise 
The Law of Workmens' Compensation (R. Vol. II, Docket #84, p. 
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4 et seq.). Of paramount concern to Professor Larsen is that 
employers be shielded from tort liability under all 
circumstances. Allowing a jury to allocate fault to an 
employer does not violate that principle of worker's 
compsnation law. An employer's liability is still limited to 
worker's compensation benefits; the employer remains immune in 
tort. 
In sum, the shield afforded employers by Utah's 
Workers Compensation Act would not be compromised if this Court 
were to adopt defendants' interpretation of the Liability 
Reform Act. 
C. The Jury's Allocation of Fault to an Employer 
Does Not Contravene Art. XVI, § 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The second question certified by the United States 
District Court is whether, in a wrongful death action such as 
this, allocation of fault to an employer violates Utah Const. 
Art. XVI, § 5. 
Plaintiff did not make this argument in her pleadings 
to the United States District Court. Defendants are uncertain 
how to respond. Perhaps defendants can best address this point 
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in their Reply Brief, after plaintiff has made known her 
argument. Nevertheless, defendants will briefly address this 
point below. 
Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5 provides: 
The right of action to recover damages for 
injuries resulting in death shall never be 
abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not 
be subject to any statutory limitation, except 
in cases where compensation for injuries 
resulting in death is provided for by law. 
Defendants make no argument that the Liability Reform 
Act abrogates the right of action for wrongful death, or 
creates a statutory limitation on the amount recoverable 
therein. Defendants do not challenge plaintiff's standing to 
bring this action, or claim any "cap" to her recovery. Thus, 
defendants1 position would not seem to violate the plain 
language of Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5. 
Defendants' interpretation of the Liability Reform Act 
focuses on the abolition of joint and several liability, and 
the restiction of liability to proportionate fault. This 
statutory framework for imposing liability is independent of 
Utah's wrongful death statutes, U.C.A. §§ 78-11-6 and 78-11-7. 
Admittedly, under the result urged by defendants, a plaintiff 
in a wrongful death action can only recover from a defendant 
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its proportionate share of liability. This is neither an 
abrogation of the right of action, nor a limitation on the 
amount recoverable. 
The distinction between abrogating the right of action 
and regulating the right of action was noted by this Court in 
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985). In Berry, this Court held the Utah Product Liability 
Act unconstitutional because it violated Utah Const. Art. XVI, 
§ 5 (as well as the "open courts" clause, Utah Const. Art. I, 
§ 11). Under certain circumstances, the Product Liability Act 
eliminated a wrongful death action before it arose, effectively 
nullifying the wrongful death statutes. Because the 
Legislature was not empowered to nullify the wrongful death 
statutes, either directly or indirectly, the Product Liability 
Act contravened Art. XVI, § 5. However, the Berry Court noted 
that the Legislature was empowered to regulate the enforcement 
of wrongful death actions, and the defenses available therein: 
Clearly, the Legislature may enact reasonable 
procedures for the enforcement of wrongful 
death actions and may provide for reasonable 
defenses that are not inconsistent with the 
fundamental nature of the wrongful death action 
itself. 
Id. at 685. 
The allocation of fault to an employer arises from the 
Liability Reform Act's abolition of joint and severable 
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liability, not from any abrogation of the right of action for 
wrongful death. The Liability Reform Act provides that a 
wrongful death defendant must answer only for his fault, and 
not that of others. This is a reasonable defense, not 
inconsistent with the fundamental nature of the wrongful death 
action, and thus does not violate Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5. 
II. OTHER JURISDICTIONS HOLD THAT NON-PARTIES (INCLUDING 
NON-PARTY EMPLOYERS) MUST BE INCLUDED ON THE SPECIAL 
VERDICT. 
Twelve years before Utah enacted its Liability Reform 
Act, the Kansas legislature passed a similar act abolishing 
joint and several liability and implementing "pure" comparative 
negligence. The 1974 Kansas Comparative Negligence Act, 
K.S.A. § 60-258a, mirrors Utah's Liability Reform Act. 
K.S.A. § 60-258a(b) provides that a jury through special 
verdict shall determine "the percentage of negligence 
attributable to each of the parties" and section (c) of the 
Kansas statute provides that upon motion "any other person 
whose causal negligence is claimed to have contributed to such 
death, personal injury, or property damage shall be joined as 
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an additional party to the action". These two sections 
correspond to § 78-27-39 and 78-27-41 of the Liability Reform 
Act, respectively. 
In Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kansas 1978), the 
Kansas Supreme Court decided whether the Kansas Comparative 
Negligence Act allowed a jury to allocate fault to 
non-parties. Brown was an automobile accident case in which 
the trial court allocated fault as follows: 
Plaintiff 0% 
Defendant 10% 
Non-party 90% 
100% 
Damages were set at $5,423. Under the pure comparative 
negligence of K.S.A. § 60-258a, plaintiff was awarded judgment 
against defendant for $542, or 10% of total damages. 
On appeal, the plaintiff in Brown argued that "Nowhere 
in the act does it state that persons who are not parties to 
the action are to have any impact on the ultimate judgment to 
be entered . . . . Therefore, it is incumbent upon a defendant 
to join such additional parties as he may deem necessary or 
advisable to determine their fault". Ijd. at 874. In rejecting 
this argument, and affirming the trial court, the Kansas 
Supreme Court reasoned that failure to allocate to non-parties 
was inconsistent with legislative intent because it saddled 
named parties with the fault of non-parties: 
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It appears after considering the intent and 
purpose of the entire statute that such a 
party's fault should be considered in each 
case to determine the other defendant's 
percentage of fault and liability, if any. 
The proportionate liability of the other 
parties to the action under 
K.S.A. § 60-258a(d) should not be increased 
merely because a party joined under 
subsection (c) has a valid defense to 
plaintiff's claim, other than lack of 
negligence. . . . [W]e conclude the intent 
and purpose of the legislature in adopting 
K.S.A. § 60-258a was to impose individual 
liability for damages based on the 
proportionate fault of all parties to the 
occurrence which gave rise to the injuries 
and damages, even though one or more parties 
cannot be joined formally as a litigant or 
be held legally responsible for his or her 
proportionate fault. 
Id. at 876. 
The Tenth Circuit Court acknowledged the propriety of 
allocation to non-parties in Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe 
Corp., 691 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1982). Hardin was a products 
liability action in which the jury allocated fault as follows: 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
Defendant 
Non-Party 
Non-Party 
Non-Party 
#1 
#2 
#1 
#2 
#3 
20% 
13.5% 
0% 
4 5% 
9% 
12.5% 
100% 
Damages were $150,000, and plaintiff was awarded judgment 
against Defendant #1 for $20,250, or 13.5% of total damages. 
On appeal in Hardin, plaintiff argued it was improper 
to compare the fault of non-parties with defendants in a 
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products liability case. In rejecting that argument, the Tenth 
Circuit Court interpreted K.S.A. § 258a and held as follows: 
The legislative intent behind § 258a is to 
ensure that all claims arising out of a 
tortious act are fully litigated in a single 
action. Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236, 579 
P.2d 1207 (1978). The joinder provision of 
§ 258a(c) allows a defendant to force a 
comparison of fault with third parties, but 
formal joinder is not a necessary 
prerequisite to comparing the fault of 
another. Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 
Kan. 439, 460, 618 P.2d 788, 803 (1980); 
Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 206-7, 
580 P.2d 867, 875-6 (1978). Thus, the 
Kansas courts have allowed comparison of the 
fault of phantom parties in products 
liability cases. Forsythe v. Coats Co., 
Inc., 230 Kan. 553, 639 P.2d 443 (1982); 
Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 
641 P.2d 353 (1982), as well as in 
negligence cases. Brown v. Kiell, 224 Kan. 
195, 580 P.2d, 867 (1978). We therefore 
reject plaintiffs contention that the fault 
of phantom parties cannot be compared under 
Kansas law. 
Id. at 454. 
One year after its decision in Hardin, the Tenth 
Circuit Court held that employers were among the class of 
non-parties whose fault should be allocated by the jury. 
Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983) 
was a products liability action in which the jury allocated 
fault as follows: 
Plaintiff 35% 
Defendant 5% 
Non-Party (plaintiff's 60% 
employer) 100% 
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Damages were $200,000, and judgment was assessed against the 
defendant manufacturer for $10,000, or 5% of total damages. 
On appeal, the plaintiff in Prince challenged the 
grounds on which fault had been allocated to her non-party 
employer. In affirming the jury's verdict, the Tenth Circuit 
Court reasoned as follows: 
Section 258a(c) of the Kansas Comparative 
Negligence Act allows a defendant to force a 
comparison of fault with third parties, even 
though formal joinder is not required. 
Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 
P.2d 788, 803 (1980). This comparison of 
fault to phantom parties has been extended 
to products liability cases. [citations 
omitted] In essence, what Kansas has done 
is to let the jury determine the degree to 
which each actor has departed from his or 
her respective duty and apportion fault 
accordingly. As explained in Kennedy, all 
types of fault, regardless of degree, are to 
be compared with that of defendant whether 
the fault is characterized as contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk, product 
misuse, or unreasonable use. All of these 
defenses depend on the reasonableness of 
plaintiff's conduct, a negligence 
concept. . . . The same general principles 
apply to phantom employers. 
Id. at 1171. 
A final Kansas precedent is Anderson v. National 
Carriers, Inc., 695 P.2d 1293 (Kan. App. 1985). Anderson was a 
personal injury case in which the jury allocated fault as 
follows: 
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Plaintiff 29% 
Defendant 22% 
Non-Party (plaintiffs 49% 
employer) 100% 
An issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in 
allowing the jury to weigh the fault of plaintiff's employer as 
a phantom defendant. The Anderson Court affirmed, holding that 
the employer was not "joined" as an actual party, but strictly 
for comparison purposes: 
National Beef was immune from suit under the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, [citations omitted] 
Therefore, National Beef cannot be made an 
actual party to the negligence action or be 
held liable for its proportionate fault. 
National Beef, however, is a necessary party 
for the purpose of considering and 
allocating proportionate fault. . . . Under 
[K.S.A. § 60-258a(c)], National Beef, 
although an immune party, may be joined as a 
•phantom party' for comparison purposes. 
Id. at 1298. 
Idaho is another jurisdiction which holds that a jury 
should apportion the fault of non-party employers in tort 
actions. In Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc. 
621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980), an employee of Steel West was 
injured in a building. The employee sued the building owner 
for negligence. The trial court allocated 80% of the 
negligence to the building owner, and 20% to the employee. On 
appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court faced an issue of first 
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impression: whether the negligence of plaintiff's employer, 
Steel West, should have been allocated by the trial court. The 
Idaho Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, finding that 
practice to be "prevalent" among state courts. 
Finally, IIC [Steel West's insurance 
carrier] and Steel West were not parties to 
the [employee's] action. The trial court 
might have felt that it was precluded from 
apportioning any negligence to Steel West 
due to its status as a non-party. If that 
be the case, we think the trial court 
erred. The inclusion of non-parties in the 
special verdict is apparently a question of 
first impression in Idaho, although we have 
reviewed other cases in which negligence was 
apportioned to a non-party. Tucker v. Union 
Oil Co. of California, 100 Idaho 590, 603 
P.2d 156 (1979); Jensen v. Shank 99 Idaho 
565, 585 P.2d 1276 (1978). In neither case 
did we comment on the practice. We now 
adopt the rule which was suggested by Tucker 
and Jensen and which is clearly the 
prevalent practice among state courts. 'It 
is established without doubt that, when 
apportioning negligence, a jury must have 
the opportunity to consider the negligence 
of all parties to the transaction, whether 
or not they be parties to the lawsuit and 
whether or not they can be liable to the 
plaintiff or to other tortfeasors either by 
operation of law or because of a prior 
release.' Connar v. West Shore Equipment 
68 Wis. 2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1975). 
id. at 402-3. 
In Lasselle v. Special Products Co. 677 P.2d 483 
(Idaho 1983), plaintiff was injured while using a posthole 
digger. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer and dealer of the 
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equipment. The dealer settled shortly before trial, and the 
trial court refused to include the dealer on the special 
verdict. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, citing Pocatello 
Ind. Park, supra, and holding that ". . . in a negligence 
action it is imperative that the jury have the opportunity to 
consider the negligence of all the parties to the 
transaction." Id. at 485. 
In Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 726 P.2d 648 (Idaho 
1985) the Idaho Supreme Court held that a jury should weigh the 
fault of non-parties in products liability actions as well: 
We have interpreted I.C. § 6-801, the 
comparative negligence statute, to require 
all negligent actors contributing to the 
causation of any accident or injuries to be 
listed on the jury verdict, whether or not 
they are parties to the action. Lasselle v. 
Special Products Co., supra; Pocatello Ind. 
Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra. Reason 
and consistency in statutory interpretation 
dictate that products liability cases based 
on strict liability should be treated the 
same. 
Id. at 654. 
The question of whether an employer should be included 
on a special verdict was certified to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court by a federal district court in Bode v. Clark Equipment 
Co. , 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986). In Bode, plaintiff was injured 
by a forklift his employer had purchased from the United States 
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government. Plaintiff sued the United States, as his employer 
was immune. A federal jury allocated fault as follows: 
Plaintiff 9% 
Defendant 1% 
Non-Party (plaintiff's 90% 
employer) 100% 
After the verdict, the issue arose as to whether plaintiff was 
entitled to recover 1% of his damages from the defendant. The 
federal court certified the question to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, which answered as follows: 
The negligence of the employer must be considered in 
determining comparative fault, even if the employer is 
immune from common law tort liability because of the 
exclusive remedy provided by the Oklahoma Worker's 
Compensation law; therefore, the plaintiff is entitled 
to collect 1% of his damages from the United States. 
Id. at 824. The Bode Court held that recovery was allowed if 
the plaintiff's fault is exceeded by the combined fault of the 
phantom defendant and the named defendant: 
[W]e can find substantial authority to support the 
conclusion that the negligence of non-parties or 
•ghost tortfeasors' should be considered in assessing 
proportionate fault in comparative negligence cases. 
Id. at 827. 
A distinction should be noted between the Oklahoma 
statute in question and the corresponding statute in Utah's 
Liability Reform Act. The relevant Oklahoma statute, 23 O.S.C. 
1981 § 13, allows recovery if plaintiff's fault is less than 
the combined fault of any "persons" causing such damage, while 
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§ 78-27-38 allows recovery if plaintiff's fault is less than 
the fault of "any defendant or group of defendants". However, 
the Bode Court's holding that non-parties should appear on the 
special verdict did not turn solely on this distinction. The 
Court went beyond the statutory language to find "substantial 
authority" in case law for its answer to the federally 
certified question. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of 
whether non-parties, such as immune employers, should appear on 
the special verdict. Although decided before enactment of the 
Liability Reform Act, Godesky v. Provo City, 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 
1984), may furnish guidance. In Godesky, an employee of a 
roofing company was injured when he touched an electrical wire 
at the Monticello Apartments in Provo. The jury allocated 70% 
of the fault to Provo, 20% to Monticello and 10% to plaintiff's 
employer. While the issue was not squarely raised on appeal, 
the Utah Supreme Court did expressly approve the jury's 
allocation of fault to the immune employer: 
This is precisely what the jury did in this case. It 
compared the negligence of Provo, Monticello and 
[plaintiff's employer] and determined that each 
actor's negligence concurred to cause plaintiff's 
injury and that [plaintiff's employer's] 10% 
negligence did not supercede Provo's 70% negligence as 
a matter of fact. 
Id. at 544-5. 
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CONCLUSION 
To accept plaintiff's position would force the jury to 
allocate all of the fault to less than all of the actors. The 
purpose of the Liability Reform Act would be defeated. This 
Court should interpret the Act to allow the jury to apportion 
fault to an employer. 
DATED this day of April, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 
Of 
Relevant Statutes: 
Utah Liability Reform Act 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit 
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to 
any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal 
duty, act, or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to injury or damages sustained by 
persons seeking recovery, including, but not 
limited to, negligence in all its degrees, 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, 
strict liability, breach of express or implied 
warranty of a product, products liability, and or 
misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person 
seeking damages or reimbursement on its own 
behalf, or on behalf of another form whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1986). 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any 
defendant or group of denfendants whose fault exceeds 
his own. However, no defendant is liable to any 
person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of 
the proportion of fault attributable to that defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1986). 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate 
special verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery and 
to each defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1986). 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the 
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is 
entitled to contribution from any other person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 (1986). 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a 
party to the litigation, may join as parties any 
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective 
proportions of fault. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41 (1986). 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects 
or impairs any common law or statutory immunity from 
liability, including, but not limited to, governmental 
immunity as provided in Cahpter 30, Title 63, and the 
exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35. 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects 
or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution 
arising from statute, contract or agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1986). 
"Exclusive Remedy" Provision of Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee, 
whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive 
remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in 
place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise, to such employee . . . on account of 
any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee in the 
course of or because of or arising out of his employment, and 
no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based 
upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-60 (1953), as amended. 
Utah Const. Art. XVI, S 5 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries 
resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount 
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, 
except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in 
death is provided for by law. 
